Time to look into who profited from the Obama-Iran deal...side deals?

Hey, How About Assigning an IG to the JCPOA?

Submitted by Terresa Monroe-Hamilton on May 14, 2018 – 1:14 pm EST

By: Denise Simon | 

There is still much dispute over the Iranian nuclear deal, the P5+1, the money, the players and the inspections. There were side deals too, do we really know all there is to know?

Perhaps it is past time that an Inspector General is assigned to the whole deal and talks. How much did the United States really pay to Iran? How many other countries participated in the deal beyond those of the P5+1? Who took bribes? Who is getting kickbacks? What is Ben Rhodes doing these days for a living? Were there really any inspections to confirm Iran’s compliance?

A little known fact is the UN’s top nuclear inspector resigned immediately when President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA.

The International Atomic Energy Agency didn’t give a reason for the sudden resignation of Tero Varjoranta, stating Saturday that it doesn’t comment on confidential personnel matters.

Varjoranta, who was in the role for almost five years, will be replaced temporarily by Massimo Aparo, an Italian nuclear engineer who was most recently the agency’s top inspector for Iran.

The move comes just days after U.S. President Donald Trump announced the United States would withdraw from the 2015 Iran nuclear accord designed to keep Tehran’s atomic weapons program in check.

The Vienna-based nuclear agency says it has no indications Iran is in breach of the accord.

*** What does Iran know now that could incriminate Western officials? If there is real evidence of international corruption by Western officials, will that affect snap-back sanctions on Iran? Will that affect relations with Britain, France or Germany? Susan Rice admitted to 2 side deals and those documents would not be published or provided.

After passing a 90-day mark on Aug. 6, the following sanctions will snap back on Iran, according to the Treasury Department:

• Sanctions on Iran buying or acquiring U.S. dollars
• Sanctions on Iran trading gold and other precious metals
• Sanctions on Iran’s sale, supply or trade of metals such as aluminum and steel, as well as graphite, coal and certain software for “integrating industrial processes”
• Sanctions on “significant” sales or purchases of Iranian rials, or the maintenance of significant funds or accounts outside the country using Iranian rials
• Sanctions on issuing Iranian debt
• Iranian auto sanctions

The U.S. will also revoke certain permissions, granted to Iran under the deal, on Aug. 6. These include halting Iran’s ability to export its carpets and foods into the U.S., as well as ending certain licensing-related transactions.

At the end of the 180-day interval on Nov. 4, another set of sanctions will once again be clamped down on Iran:

• Sanctions on Iran’s ports, as well as the country’s shipping and shipping sectors
• Sanctions on buying petroleum and petrochemical products with a number of Iranian oil companies
• Sanctions on foreign financial institutions transacting with the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian financial institutions
• Sanctions on the provision of certain financial messaging services to Iran’s central bank and other Iranian financial institutions
• Sanctions on the provision of underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance
• Sanctions on Iran’s energy sector

The following day, on Nov. 5, the Trump administration will disallow U.S.-owned foreign entities from being allowed to engage in certain transactions with Iran. Sanctions on certain Iranian individuals will also be re-imposed on Nov. 5.

Read the Treasury’s full guide to the re-imposition of Iran nuclear deal sanctions here.

*** Why are we only focusing on Iran regarding the nuclear deal? Why not their global reign of terror?

Iran, a State Sponsor of Terrorism, continues to invest in proxy terrorist and militant organizations that threaten the Homeland and US interests and engage in activities that impede US counterterrorism goals. This hearing will examine trends in Iran’s external operations and capabilities and consider the near-term and long-term security implications of Iranian support for Shia militants and terrorist groups operating in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Latin America.