A Historic Moment: The Case for Ending Both the Iranian Regime and Hamas Once and for All
The critical question is whether we will stop at weakening the Iranian regime or Hamas or move toward ensuring that they can never again recover as long-term threats to their neighbors or global security. At this moment, leaving those regimes in place – the ruling mullahs in Iran or Hamas in Gaza — is probably the most dangerous option.
Authoritarian regimes such as Iran's, and terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic State and the Taliban, rarely respond to setbacks by abandoning their ambitions. Instead, they pause, regroup, and rebuild.
Russia and China, each with its own anti-American calculations, could provide political cover, technological assistance, and indirect support that would allow Iran to resume its nuclear program. China has already been supplying Iran with "almost everything but troops" during this war, and supplying Russia with military materiel for its war against Ukraine.
If Iran's regime and Hamas are allowed to recover, their primary strategic objective will likely become to rearm as quickly as possible, and we will be right back at war again.
Stopping halfway through such efforts only allows threats to reemerge dangerously in the future. History will judge whether these two opportunities presented today were seized — or allowed to slip away.
What has taken place in recent weeks is nothing short of historic. For decades, the Iranian regime and its proxies, including Hamas, have operated with a sense of impunity. For decades, Iran's rulers have expanded their regional influence, armed their proxy militias, threatened their neighbors, and steadily advanced their weapons or mass destruction programs. While various countries imposed sanctions and Israel and the United States occasionally conducted limited military responses, no large-scale effort was ever undertaken to fundamentally weaken the political and military power deep inside Iran. That reality has now changed dramatically.
Now, for the first time, both the Iranian regime and Hamas have experienced direct and sustained military campaigns at a scale they had long assumed would never occur.
Strategic air strikes have damaged key Iranian facilities, command centers, and military infrastructure. Defense networks, missile production facilities and launchers and military bases have been targeted -- significantly limiting Iran's ability to project power beyond its borders. Many elements of its naval capabilities have also been struck, reducing its capacity to threaten international shipping lanes and regional maritime security.
These developments already represent a remarkable shift in the strategic balance of the Middle East. No American president or coalition of countries had ever dared to seriously challenge the Iranian regime or any of its proxies. The military infrastructures that both Iran and Hamas had spent decades building and protecting, have now been significantly degraded. Their leadership structures have been shaken, and their ability to coordinate attacks, disrupted. These developments demonstrate that malign actors, long viewed as untouchable, are in fact quite vulnerable when confronted with sustained and coordinated pressure.
Despite these achievements, however, the world now faces an extremely dangerous turning point. The question is no longer whether the Iranian regime or Hamas can be weakened — they clearly can. The critical question is whether we will stop at weakening the Iranian regime or Hamas or move toward ensuring that they can never again recover as long-term threats to their neighbors or global security. At this moment, leaving those regimes in place – the ruling mullahs in Iran or Hamas in Gaza — is probably the most dangerous option.
Authoritarian regimes such as Iran's, and terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic State and the Taliban, rarely respond to setbacks by abandoning their ambitions. Instead, they pause, regroup, and rebuild. If the Iranian regime is allowed to survive this moment and regain stability, it will almost certainly dedicate its remaining resources to achieving what it has long sought: nuclear weapons. Such weapons in Iran's hands would fundamentally change the strategic landscape of the Middle East and provide the regime with a powerful shield against future military pressure.
It would be naïve to assume that the Iranian regime and Hamas will abandon their ambitions even after the destruction they have experienced. On the contrary, the leaders in Tehran will most likely conclude that their greatest strategic mistake was not obtaining nuclear weapons sooner. If they had possessed nuclear deterrence before this conflict, they might believe that the United States and Israel would never have dared to launch such a campaign against them. This realization could accelerate their determination to acquire nuclear weapons at any cost.
There are several potential pathways through which the regime could attempt to achieve this objective. One path is that Iran still possesses hidden stockpiles of enriched uranium or possibly undisclosed facilities capable of rapidly producing nuclear material. Over the years, the regime has demonstrated considerable skill in concealing aspects of its nuclear program. Even if many facilities have been destroyed, the possibility that covert infrastructure remains cannot be dismissed.
Another possibility involves rapid reconstruction of the nuclear program once the conflict subsides. If the regime survives and external pressure weakens, it could quietly rebuild its nuclear infrastructure in secret locations. Advances in technology, as well as lessons learned from past international inspections, could allow the regime to move faster and more discreetly than before.
There is also the possibility of external assistance. Countries that view the United States and its allies as strategic rivals may see value in preserving the Iranian regime as a geopolitical partner. Nations such as North Korea and Pakistan already possess nuclear capabilities and have historically engaged in military technology exchanges with other states. Russia and China, each with its own anti-American calculations, could provide political cover, technological assistance, and indirect support that would allow Iran to resume its nuclear program. China has already been supplying Iran with "almost everything but troops" during this war, and supplying Russia with military materiel for its war against Ukraine.
If Iran's regime and Hamas are allowed to recover, their primary strategic objective will likely become to rearm as quickly as possible, and we will be right back at war again.
For Iran, a single nuclear weapon can destroy an entire city. In a region as densely populated and strategically sensitive as the Middle East, the consequences would be catastrophic not only to Israel but to its neighbors in the Gulf. Even the possibility of nuclear weapons use would introduce a level of instability and fear that would reshape global politics.
Finally, today, the strategic landscape has shifted. The regimes have been weakened and their military infrastructures severely damaged. This situation represents a historic turning point. What has already been accomplished by the United States and Israel is breathtaking. Stopping halfway through such efforts only allows threats to reemerge dangerously in the future. History will judge whether these two opportunities presented today were seized — or allowed to slip away.
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh, is a political scientist, Harvard-educated analyst, and board member of Harvard International Review. He has authored several books on the US foreign policy. He can be reached at dr.rafizadeh@post.harvard.edu
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